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Abstract Although convinced by Frankfurt-style cases that moral responsibility does not 
require the ability to do otherwise, semicompatibilists have not wanted to accept a parallel claim 
about moral responsibility for omissions, and so they have accepted asymmetrical requirements 
on moral responsibility for actions and omissions. In previous work, I have presented a challenge 
to various attempts at defending this asymmetry. My view is that semicompatibilists should give 
up these defenses and instead adopt symmetrical requirements on moral responsibility for actions 
and omissions, and in this paper I highlight three advantages of doing so: first, it avoids a strange 
implication of the truth of determinism; second, it allows for a principled reply to Philip 
Swenson’s recent ‘No Principled Difference Argument’; third, it provides a reason to reject a 
crucial inference rule invoked by Peter van Inwagen’s ‘Direct Argument’ for the incompatibility 
of moral responsibility and determinism. 
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1. Introduction 
 Semicompatibilists believe that the freedom required for moral responsibility is 
compatible with causal determinism even if the ability (or freedom) to do otherwise is not.1 In 
fact, these theorists reject the following principle: 
Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP): A person is responsible for performing an 
action only if they could have done otherwise than perform that action. 
To support their rejection of this principle, semicompatibilists typically invoke ‘Frankfurt-style 
cases’, which are named after Harry Frankfurt because of his very influential paper [Frankfurt 
1969]. In that paper, Frankfurt presented a case very similar to this one: 
 
1 Semicompatibilists are also sometimes called ‘actual-sequence compatibilists’ or ‘Frankfurt-
style compatibilists’. Hereafter I use ‘responsibility’ as shorthand for ‘moral responsibility’ (and 
likewise for cognates).  
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Frankfurt-Style Case (FSC): Black wishes Jones to cast his vote for presidential 
candidate A. In order to ensure that Jones does this, he implants a chip in Jones’s brain 
which allows him to control Jones’s behavior in the voting booth. (Jones has no idea 
about any of this.) Black prefers that Jones vote for candidate A on his own. But if Jones 
starts to become inclined to vote for anyone other than A, Black will immediately use his 
chip to cause Jones to vote for candidate A instead. As it turns out, though, Jones votes 
for candidate A on his own and Back never exerts any causal influence on Jones’s 
behavior. [Swenson 2015: 1279-80] 
In this case, Jones is apparently responsible for voting for candidate A. Yet Jones cannot do 
otherwise than vote for candidate A. Thus, PAP appears to be false. 
But now consider a case in which an agent omits to perform an action that he is unable to 
perform: 
Sharks: John is walking along the beach and sees a child drowning in the water. John 
believes that he could rescue the child without much effort. Due to his laziness, he 
decides not to attempt to rescue the child. The child drowns. Unbeknownst to John, there 
is a school of sharks hidden beneath the water. If John had attempted to rescue the child, 
the sharks would have eaten him and his rescue attempt would have been unsuccessful. 
[Swenson 2015: 1280; originally from Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 125] 
In this case, John omits to rescue the child from drowning, yet John does not appear to be 
responsible for this omission because of the presence of the sharks. Even if PAP is false, then, 
the following principle looks very plausible: 
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Principle of Possible Action (PPA): A person is responsible for omitting to perform an 
action only if they could have performed that action.2 
Since the Sharks case seems to show that an agent cannot be responsible for omitting to perform 
an action that they are unable to perform, this case appears to support PPA. 
 Although they are motivated by cases like FSC to reject PAP, semicompatibilists have 
not wanted to give up PPA, and so they have defended asymmetrical requirements on 
responsibility for actions, on the one hand, and responsibility for omissions, on the other hand. In 
other words, they accept the following thesis: 
Asymmetry Thesis (AT): PAP is false, but PPA is true.3 
In other work [Cyr 2017], I have argued that AT is untenable and that recent modifications of AT 
by semicompatibilists like John Martin Fischer [2017] and Carolina Sartorio [2005] are 
problematic as well. Since semicompatibilists are committed to rejecting PAP, and since PPA is 
a very attractive principle, one might take my argument against AT as an objection to 
semicompatibilism. But, of course, semicompatibilists have an alternative, namely to give up 
PPA and to accept symmetrical requirements on responsibility for actions and omissions. 
 In this paper, I present three advantages (for semicompatibilists) of adopting symmetrical 
requirements on responsibility for actions and omissions. The first is simplest, and it is that 
 
2 For a discussion of this and related principles, see van Inwagen [1978]. 
3 Not all semicompatibilists have stated their view in exactly this way. Fischer [1985–1986] and 
Fischer and Ravizza [1991] did defend AT, but Fischer has been convinced—partly because of 
Frankfurt’s [1994] reply—that the simple version of AT is false. Fischer and Ravizza [1998] 
argue that what matters is whether or not some state of affairs is sensitive to an agent’s actions, 
which does not seem equivalent to AT. Nevertheless, Fischer and Ravizza’s view does imply an 
asymmetry between action cases and (certain) omission cases, even if their view is not motivated 
primarily by reflection on FSC and Sharks. Interestingly, Fischer’s most recent view [Fischer 
2017], which is closer to AT than the view that he has defended in the meantime, is developed in 
response to Swenson’s [2015] argument that I will address later in the paper. 
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adopting a symmetrical account avoids a strange implication of the truth of determinism. As 
noted above, semicompatibilists are open to the possibility that determinism precludes the ability 
to do otherwise. If so, and if PAP is false but PPA true, then agents in deterministic worlds can 
be responsible for their actions but not for their omissions. I argue that semicompatibilists should 
not countenance such a result. 
  The second reason to adopt a symmetrical account is that it allows for a principled reply 
to Philip Swenson’s [2015; 2016] recent ‘No Principled Difference Argument’ against 
semicompatibilism. According to Swenson, since there is no principled difference between a 
series of cases that begins with Sharks and ends with a case like FSC, and since it is intuitive that 
the agent is not responsible for the relevant omission in Sharks, we should infer that the agent is 
not responsible for the relevant action in FSC. Rather than denying any of Swenson’s plausible 
‘no relevant difference’ claims, as an asymmetrical approach must, my symmetrical approach 
accepts these claims but maintains that the agent in Sharks is responsible for his omission. This 
is a prima facie counterintuitive position, though, so I go on to provide an error theory for the 
attraction of alternative replies. 
Third and finally, a symmetrical account provides a reason to reject a crucial inference 
rule invoked by Peter van Inwagen’s [1983] ‘Direct Argument’ for the incompatibility of 
responsibility and determinism. According to van Inwagen’s ‘Rule A’, no one is responsible for 
necessary truths. But once it is granted that one can be responsible for an omission without 
having the ability to perform the omitted action, we can generate cases in which an agent is 
responsible for omitting to perform an action that they necessarily did not perform, and thus 
these cases constitute counterexamples to Rule A. This too may seem, prima facie, to be a 
counterintuitive position, yet the very same resources invoked in my error theory for the 
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attraction of alternative replies to Swenson’s argument will help us to see that denying Rule A is 
not as problematic as it initially seems. 
While I hope to show the advantages for semicompatibilists of adopting symmetrical 
requirements on responsibility for actions and omissions, it is not the aim of this paper to provide 
a complete semicompatibilist account here. It is worth mentioning, though, that the 
semicompatibilist has various options. One is to opt for a hierarchal form of compatibilism, such 
as Frankfurt’s [1988] own view, instead of appealing to reasons-responsiveness, as Fischer and 
others have wanted to do. Another option is to keep an agent’s reasons front-and-center but to 
reject accounts of reasons-responsiveness that imply asymmetrical requirements on 
responsibility for actions and omissions. One view along these lines would be that, so long as an 
agent succeeds in bringing about the action/omission that the agent intended, the agent may be 
responsible even if the action/omission was inevitable. Of course, much more would need to be 
said about how to develop either of these sketches into a full-fledged semicompatibilism with 
symmetrical requirements on responsibility for actions and omissions, but the point of this paper 
is simply to motivate such a project.  
 
2. The Threat from Determinism 
 Arguably the biggest challenge to compatibilism is the Consequence Argument, which 
was made popular by Peter van Inwagen [1983] and can be sketched as follows: If determinism 
is true, then propositions describing all of our actions are entailed by propositions expressing the 
laws of nature and propositions about the intrinsic state of the world long before we existed. In 
order for us to have the ability to do otherwise than what we in fact do, then, we would need to 
have a choice about either the laws of nature or the intrinsic state of the world in the distant past. 
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But no one has a choice about those things, so, if determinism is true, we lack the ability to do 
otherwise than we what we actually do. 
One putative asset of semicompatibilism is that it is consistent with the soundness of the 
Consequence Argument. After all, if some case like FSC is successful, then we may be 
responsible despite lacking the ability to do otherwise, and so responsibility may be compatible 
with determinism even if the ability to do otherwise isn’t.4 Given the force of the Consequence 
Argument, being able to accept its soundness gives semicompatibilism a considerable advantage 
over classical compatibilism—the view that responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise 
and that this ability is compatible with determinism. 
But now suppose, as I am inclined to believe, that the Consequence Argument is indeed 
sound. Suppose also, as semicompatibilists have claimed, that there are asymmetrical 
requirements on responsibility for actions, on the one hand, and omissions, on the other. It 
follows that, if determinism is true, we are only ever responsible for our actions and never for 
our omissions. After all, given the soundness of the Consequence Argument, determinism would 
preclude not only the ability to do otherwise than what we do but also the ability to do what we 
omit to do. If responsibility for an omission requires the ability to perform the omitted action, as 
PPA maintains, then (assuming the soundness of the Consequence Argument) determinism 
would preclude responsibility for omissions. 
 Semicompatibilists should not countenance the result that we may be responsible for our 
actions but not (any of) our omissions. As Randolph Clarke points out: 
 
4 Of course, as Fischer has always been careful to point out [cf. Fischer 1982], compatibilism 
about responsibility and determinism doesn’t follow straightaway from the success of some case 
like FSC. It could be that responsibility and determinism are incompatible for some other reason 
than that determinism precludes the ability to do otherwise. 
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If we’re morally responsible for anything, omitting and refraining are among the things 
for which we’re responsible. One might be blameworthy for failing to keep a promise, or 
praiseworthy for holding one’s tongue. There can be criminal responsibility as well; the 
parents might be guilty of manslaughter for not doing something that, as parents, they had 
a legal duty to do. [2014: 1-2] 
Moreover, Clarke continues, ‘Like acting, omitting and refraining reflect on us as moral agents. 
They show what we care about, and sometimes what we don’t care enough about’ [2014: 2]. A 
view that admits the possibility that we are responsible for actions but never for omissions fails 
to take seriously the centrality of omissions to morality, to the law, and to our relationships with 
each other.  
 Some semicompatibilists (most notably Fischer) take care to ensure that their theories do 
not imply that aspects of our view of ourselves as responsible agents depend on whether or not 
determinism is true. It would be a mistake for our self-conception to ‘hang by a thread’ in this 
way. For example, Fischer says that ‘our basic status as distinctively free and morally 
responsible agents should not depend on the arcane ruminations—and deliverances—of the 
theoretical physicists and cosmologists’ [2006: 5; cf. Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 16]. While our 
status as free and responsible agents does not completely depend on our being responsible for 
omissions (since we would still be free and responsible agents even if we were only ever 
responsible for actions), given the centrality of omissions to morality, to the law, and to our 
interpersonal relationships, anyone motivated by this point about the ‘resiliency’ of our self-
image should be motivated to preserve our responsibility for omissions too, not leaving this to 
‘hang by a thread’ from which responsibility for actions does not hang. 
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 As I noted above, Fischer no longer accepts the simple asymmetrical view (AT) that PAP 
is false but PPA true. Fischer now accepts the following: 
Fischer’s New Asymmetry Thesis (FNAT): responsibility for actions and simple 
omissions does not require freedom to do otherwise, whereas responsibility for complex 
omissions does require such freedom. [cf. Fischer 2017: 156]  
FNAT appeals to the distinction between simple omissions and complex omissions. The former 
are ‘identical to, or fully constituted by, a bodily movement, where this can include the body’s 
keeping still (or a part of the body’s keeping still)’ [Fischer 2017: 156]. A complex omission, by 
contrast, ‘is not identical to or fully constituted by (say) keeping my body still; it involves 
something more than the body—something about the relationship between the body and the 
external world’ [Fischer 2017: 156]. Returning to some of Clarke’s examples of omissions, 
holding one’s tongue is an example of a simple omission, since it is identical to (or constituted 
by) keeping one’s body perfectly still, whereas a case of manslaughter by omitting to feed one’s 
child is a complex omission, since it involves something more than the parent’s body. According 
to FNAT, the requirements on responsibility for simple omissions are symmetrical to those on 
responsibility for actions (that is, they do not require the ability to do otherwise), but the 
requirements on responsibility for complex omissions are different. Responsibility for complex 
omissions requires the ability to perform the omitted action.  
Now, suppose again that the Consequence Argument is sound and that we discover that 
our world is deterministic. It follows, according to FNAT, that we are only ever responsible for 
our actions and simple omissions but never for our complex omissions. But notice that it is not 
only simple omissions but also complex omissions that are central to morality, to the law, and to 
our interpersonal relationships. Besides omitting to feed one’s child, examples of complex 
 9 
omissions include omitting to keep one’s promise to pick up a friend from the airport, omitting to 
vote for the most qualified candidate for a position, omitting to come to a complete stop at a stop 
sign, etc. Even if FNAT allows that we are responsible for our simple omissions on the 
assumption of determinism, the fact that it rules out responsibility for complex omissions on this 
assumption is just as problematic as the original asymmetrical view.5 
Given that semicompatibilists are open to the possibility that the Consequence Argument 
is sound and determinism true, adopting asymmetrical requirements on responsibility for actions 
and omissions commits them to a strange picture of what we may be responsible for—a picture 
that, I believe, is at odds with our self-image. Since this strange implication can be avoided by 
adopting a symmetrical account of the conditions on responsibility, semicompatibilists have at 
least some reason for doing so.  
 
3. Swenson’s ‘No Principled Difference Argument’ 
 Swenson has recently presented a challenge to semicompatibilists by identifying a 
tension in our judgments that agents in cases like FSC are responsible, on the one hand, and our 
 
5 As an associate editor for this journal has pointed out to me, perhaps someone like Fischer 
could respond to this point by claiming that our responsibility for complex omissions can be 
entirely explained by our responsibility for simple omissions that are essential elements in the 
causal chain leading to a complex omission. I am skeptical, though, that responsibility for all 
complex omissions can be derived from responsibility for simple omissions (and actions) for 
three reasons. First, it is not obvious what the relevant simple omissions (and actions) would be 
in typical cases of significant complex omissions like the case of manslaughter by omitting to 
feed one’s child. Some candidates may include, say, eating all of the remaining food in the house 
on Sunday, or omitting to decide to feed the child on Monday morning. But, and here is a second 
worry, it is not clear that the parent’s responsibility for actions and simple omissions like these 
would add up to responsibility for manslaughter. Finally, setting aside these first two worries, 
this type of response would require the view that an agent’s responsibility for a complex 
omission can be ‘traced’ back to the agent’s responsibility for something else, and it remains a 
matter of dispute whether there can be a satisfactory account of tracing—see, e.g., Vargas [2005] 
and Fischer and Tognazzini [2009]. 
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judgments that agents in cases like Sharks are not responsible, on the other hand. The argument, 
as Swenson presents it, relies on a series of cases, each of which, Swenson claims, are not 
relevantly different from each other. Before we can consider the argument, though, we need to 
have the remaining cases before us. Swenson begins with Sharks and then provides three 
additional cases and argues that there is no relevant difference between them with respect to 
John’s responsibility. Here are the three cases: 
Penned-in Sharks: Everything occurs just as in Sharks except for the fact that the sharks 
are penned up. However, unbeknownst to John, there is an evil observer who wishes for 
the child to drown. If John had jumped into the water, the evil observer would have 
released the sharks, and as a result, the sharks would still have prevented John from 
rescuing the child. But the presence of the observer plays no role in the actual sequence 
of events. [2015: 1281]6 
Sloth: In this case, there are no sharks present to prevent a rescue by John. The evil 
observer is now monitoring John’s thoughts instead. John decides (without deliberating 
much) to refrain from saving the child. If John had seriously considered attempting to 
rescue the child, the evil observer would have caused him to experience an irresistible 
urge to refrain from saving the child. However, this observer still plays no role in causing 
John’s decision to refrain from attempting a rescue. [2015: 1281]7 
Hero: John decides (without deliberating much) to rescue the child, and he successfully 
does so. Unbeknownst to him, if he had seriously considered refrain[ing] from rescuing 
 
6 Cf. Fischer and Ravizza [1998: 138], who credit David Kaplan for suggesting the case. 
7 Cf. Frankfurt [1994]. 
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the child, our now benevolent observer would have caused him to immediately 
experience an irresistible urge to rescue the child. [2015: 1282]8 
Now that all of Swenson’s cases are on the table, we can consider his argument: 
(P1) In Sharks John is not responsible for failing to save the child. 
(P2) If John is not responsible for failing to save the child in Sharks, then he is not 
responsible for failing to save the child in Penned-in Sharks. 
(P3) If John is not responsible for failing to save the child in Penned-in Sharks, then he is 
not responsible for failing to save the child in Sloth. 
(P4) If John is not responsible for failing to save the child in Sloth, then he is not 
responsible for saving the child in Hero. 
Thus;  
(Conclusion) John is not responsible for saving the child in Hero. [2015: 1282] 
And since Hero is structurally identical to FSC, Swenson says, ‘the cogency of this argument 
gives us reason to doubt that Jones is responsible for voting as he does’ [2015: 1282]. Not only 
does this count against one of the semicompatibilist’s core commitments (that there is some 
successful case like FSC), but, Swenson argues, there is a general (and in principle) reason to 
doubt that semicompatibilists will be able successfully to respond to his argument. I will return 
to this general reason later on.   
 In the next section, I will argue that adopting a symmetrical account of the conditions on 
responsibility for actions and omissions provides semicompatibilists with a principled reason for 
granting that John is responsible in all of Swenson’s cases, including Sharks. Now, almost 
everyone who has written about Sharks has agreed that John is not responsible for his omission 
 
8 Cf. Fischer and Ravizza [1991]. 
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in this case. In section 5, I will provide an error theory for the attraction of denying John’s 
responsibility in Sharks, but it is also worth noting that Florian Cova [2017] has discovered that 
people’s intuitions about Sharks are actually quite mixed.9 It may turn out, then, that we have 
independent reason to reject the non-responsibility intuition in Sharks and to accept the agent’s 
responsibility in FSC. 
 
4 Answering the ‘No Principled Difference Argument’  
 I want to suggest a new type of response to Swenson’s argument (one that Swenson 
[2015] ignores but is briefly addressed at the end of Swenson [2016]) according to which John is 
responsible for failing to save the child in Sharks, and according to which he is responsible in the 
remainder of the cases as well, since there is no responsibility-relevant difference between the 
cases. In other words, it is open to semicompatibilists to grant Swenson his series of no-relevant-
difference claims, which appear in (P2)-(P4), but to start with Hero (or FSC), in which John is 
intuitively responsible, and to work backward from there, using the contrapositives of (P2)-(P4), 
to establish John’s responsibility in Sharks. In (still) other words, Swenson’s modus ponens may 
be the semicompatibilist’s modus tollens. Below is a ‘Modified No Principled Difference 
Argument’: 
(P1*) In Hero John is responsible for saving the child. 
(P2*) If John is responsible for saving the child in Hero, then he is responsible for failing 
to save the child in Sloth. 
 
9 Thanks to two anonymous referees for pointing out this additional support for the view I am 
defending. 
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(P3*) If John is responsible for failing to save the child in Sloth, then he is responsible for 
failing to save the child in Penned-in Sharks. 
(P4*) If John is responsible for failing to save the child in Penned-in Sharks, then he is 
responsible for failing to save the child in Sharks. 
Thus;  
(Conclusion*) John is responsible for failing to save the child in Sharks. 
Since Hero is structurally identical to FSC, the cogency of the argument provides 
semicompatibilists (who were antecedently committed to the success of cases like FSC to falsify 
PAP) with a reason to take John to be responsible for failing to save the child in Sharks. 
 The response I am suggesting on behalf of semicompatibilists is structurally parallel to 
the so-called ‘hard-line reply’ to the Manipulation Argument against compatibilism.10 The 
Manipulation Argument attempts to show that ordinary agents in deterministic worlds are not 
relevantly different from manipulated agents whom we intuitively judge not to be responsible. 
After presenting a case in which an agent is manipulated into performing some action from some 
compatibilist-friendly agential structure (CAS), the Manipulation Argument proceeds in the 
following form: 
1. If S is manipulated in manner X to A, then S does not A of their own free will and is 
therefore not responsible for A’ing. 
2. An agent manipulated in manner X to A is no different in any relevant respect from any 
normally functioning agent determined to do A from CAS. 
 
10 For a widely discussed version of the Manipulation Argument, see Pereboom [2001: 110-117]. 
For a ‘hard-line reply’ to this argument, see McKenna [2008]. I follow McKenna’s presentation 
of the manipulation argument in what follows. 
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3. Therefore, if S is a normally functioning agent determined to A from CAS, S does not A 
of their own free will and therefore is not responsible for A’ing.11 
Now, a compatibilist advancing the hard-line reply to the Manipulation Argument admits the 
truth of the second premise (that there is no relevant different between ordinary determined 
agents and certain manipulated agents) but denies the non-responsibility of ordinary determined 
agents and thus also denies the non-responsibility of certain manipulated agents. 
 Just as the hard-line reply to the Manipulation Argument denies the conclusion of that 
argument while granting the no-relevant-difference claim, my hard-line reply to Swenson’s No 
Principled Difference Argument is to deny the conclusion of that argument while granting the 
no-relevant-difference claim. Instead of taking a ‘soft-line’ approach to Swenson’s cases, 
attempting to point out a relevant difference between Sharks and Penned-in Sharks (or some 
other pair of cases),12 a semicompatibilist can grant Swenson that there is not a relevant 
difference between the cases without accepting that agents in cases like FSC (hereafter ‘FSCs’) 
lack responsibility. Since the semicompatibilist antecedently judges agents in FSCs to be 
responsible, they can take the hard-line approach, codified in the Modified No Principled 
Difference Argument, and infer that the agent in Sharks is responsible for his omission.13 
 To be sure, Swenson and others will think that starting with the judgment that the agents 
in FSCs are responsible is problematic, since it leads the hard-liner to conclude that the agent in 
 
11 See McKenna [2008: 143]. 
12 For soft-line replies, see Byrd [2007], Clarke [1994; 2011], Fischer and Ravizza [1998: 140-
141], and Sartorio [2011]. See Swenson [2016] for objections. 
13 For another route to the same ‘hard-liner’ position, see Kearns [2011], who notes that cases 
like Sharks are not relevantly different from Locke’s famous example of the man in the locked 
room [cf. Locke 1690 (1975), book 2, Chap. 21, Sect. 10]. Kearns’s cases are also relevant to 
Rule A of van Inwagen’s Direct Argument, which we’ll return to below. 
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Sharks is responsible. But the judgment that agents in FSCs are responsible is widespread, and 
not just among semicompatibilists.14 (Additionally, as noted above, people’s responses to Sharks 
are quite mixed.) For those of us convinced of Swenson’s no-relevant-difference claims, it will 
matter which case we take as our starting point, and Swenson has not shown there to be anything 
problematic about denying what one might have initially judged plausible about Sharks, given 
the initial plausibility of FSCs and given Swenson’s no-relevant-difference point. 
 
5. An Error Theory for the Attraction of a Soft-Line Reply 
 Given the simplicity of a hard-line reply to the No Principled Difference Argument, one 
may wonder why semicompatibilists have been so eager to show that there is a difference 
between FSCs and cases like Sharks. In what follows, I sketch a possible error theory for the 
widespread attempts at accommodating John’s lack of responsibility in Sharks.15 As it happens, 
the resources invoked in this error theory will also be relevant to my discussion of giving up 
Rule A later on. 
 Cases in which agents fail to be responsible for omissions when they could not have 
succeeded in doing otherwise are ubiquitous. Consider the following case: 
Burglary: While John is at the bank, a group of men (who intend to rob the bank) begin 
pointing guns at everyone in the bank, threatening them not to move. Very close to John 
is a button labeled ‘Press In Case Of Emergency’. If John were to press the button, the 
police would be notified and the burglary would be thwarted. Because he is held at gun-
 
14 For examples of incompatibilists who are convinced that agents in FSCs are responsible, see 
Stump [1996], Hunt [2000], and Pereboom [2003].  
15 This error theory parallels McKenna’s suggested explanation for our intuitions about certain 
manipulated agents. See McKenna [2008: 156-158]. 
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point, however, John is unable to thwart the burglary, and the burglars succeed in robbing 
the bank. 
In Burglary, not only is it clear that John is not responsible for omitting to thwart the burglary, 
but it is clear that the factors which made it the case that John could not have succeeded in 
thwarting the burglary also played a causal role in his omitting to thwart the burglary. Such cases 
are the basis for legitimate ‘I couldn’t help it!’ claims, for we take it that the agent’s inability to 
do the thing in question actually played a role in preventing her from doing it. 
 Since cases like Burglary are quite common, it should not be surprising that in similar but 
relevantly different cases, namely those in which the agent’s inability to do the thing in question 
does not actually play a role in preventing her from doing it, we find ourselves with the intuition 
that the agents are not responsible for their omissions.16 Our intuitions about cases of 
responsibility for omissions depend, to some extent, on the ordinary and common cases like 
Burglary, cases in which the agents’ inabilities to perform certain actions constitute genuine 
excuses for their not performing them, and on our typical practice of excusing agents in them. 
When we shift to a case like Sharks, we find that, when we consider the presence of the Sharks 
and the counterfactual scenario in which John attempts to save the child but fails, we have the 
same intuition about this case as about the ordinary cases in which the factors preventing the 
relevant action from possibly occurring also prevent it from actually occurring. But the sharks do 
not play a role in John’s failure to save the child, while the men holding John down in Burglary 
do play a role in his failure to thwart the burglary.17  
 
16 Frankfurt [1969] makes a similar claim about responsibility for actions and the intuitive appeal 
of PAP. 
17 Similarly, as I will discuss below, the factors which bring it about that only one action is 
possible for an agent in FSCs do not also play a role in that action’s actual occurrence. 
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 Near the end of his classic article, Frankfurt remarked that agents in FSCs could not 
(without being disingenuous) offer certain excuses for what they had done: 
We often do, to be sure, excuse people for what they have done when they tell us (and we 
believe them) that they could not have done otherwise. But this is because we assume that 
what they tell us serves to explain why they did what they did. We take it for granted that 
they are not being disingenuous, as a person would be who cited as an excuse for the fact 
that he could not have avoided doing what he did but who knew full well that it was not 
at all because of this that he did it. [1969: 837-838] 
I agree with Frankfurt’s explanation of why agents in FSCs could not offer as an excuse that they 
could not have done otherwise, but I see no reason to think that similar considerations do not 
apply in omission cases like Sharks.18 Suppose that John omits to save the child and later 
discovers that sharks had been present. And suppose that, when approached by the child’s parent, 
John says that he could not have done otherwise than omit to save the child. Clearly it would be a 
moral failing of John to cite the sharks’ presence as an excuse for what he failed to do; he knew 
full well, as Frankfurt says, that it was not at all because of this that he did it.19 
 
18 Nor do I think Frankfurt would disagree with applying these considerations to cases involving 
omissions. As he points out, ‘There appears to be no fundamental reason why instances of 
performing actions should be, as such, morally different from instances of not performing them. 
After all, the distinction between actions and omissions is not a very deep one’ [1994: 620]. 
19 In more recent work [Swenson Forthcoming], Swenson offers an alternative explanation for 
the failure of this sort of excuse. Building on work on by Fischer [1985-1986] and Zimmerman 
[2002], Swenson claims that John (in Sharks) is just as blameworthy as he would have been had 
the sharks not been present, but he also claims that the scope of what John is blameworthy for 
shrinks when the sharks are present. If this is right, then perhaps John’s excuse fails because it 
does not reduce John’s degree of blameworthiness, and a successful excuse reduces an agent’s 
degree of blameworthiness. I do not have space to give a complete assessment of this alternative 
here, but, because I do not think Swenson’s scope/degree response to moral luck is successful 
(for reasons I plan to develop in future work), I do not think this alternative explanation for the 
failure of John’s excuse will be ultimately successful either. 
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  In cases like Burglary, however, it would be perfectly appropriate for John to offer as an 
excuse the fact that he was unable to thwart the burglary. The reason for this is that the factors 
that make it inevitable that John omits to thwart the burglary also play a causal role in his failing 
to thwart the burglary. And, as Frankfurt noted, it is precisely because the factors that make an 
agent’s action inevitable in FSCs do not play a causal role in the bringing about the agent’s 
action that the agent is apparently responsible (and thus that the case serves as a counterexample 
to PAP): 
[T]here may be circumstances that constitute sufficient conditions for a certain action to 
be performed by someone and that therefore make it impossible for the person to do 
otherwise, but that do not actually impel the person or in any way produce his action. A 
person may do something in circumstances that leave him no alternative to doing it, 
without these circumstances actually moving him or leading him to do it—without them 
playing any role, indeed, in bringing it about that he does what he does. [1969: 830]20 
Crucially, the factors at play in FSCs that constitute sufficient conditions for the agent’s action 
do not play a causal role in the production of his action.  
 As it happens, it is precisely these considerations which Swenson takes to give rise to a 
general reason to doubt that semicompatibilists can successfully to respond to his argument. 
Swenson notes that Fischer has helpfully distinguished between the factors of a situation which 
bring about a particular event, which Fischer dubs the ‘A-Factors’, and the factors which render 
the event inevitable but need not cause or bring about the event, which he dubs the ‘B-Factors’.21 
The lesson to be learned from the FSCs, then, is that mere B-Factors (which are not also A-
 
20 Part of this quotation is cited by Swenson [2015: 1283]. 
21 Cf. Fischer [2010: 269], cited by Swenson [2015: 1283]. 
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Factors) are not relevant to agents’ responsibility. (In Frankfurt’s terminology: circumstances 
that constitute sufficient conditions for a certain action to be performed need not actually impel 
the person or in any way produce his action.) But Swenson argues that this lesson provides an in 
principle reason to doubt that a reply to the No Principled Difference Argument will be 
successful: 
This reveals an additional challenge for anyone who wishes to reply to the no principled 
difference argument. The problem is that each case appealed to in the no principled 
difference argument centrally involves the presence of a mere B-Factor (the sharks in 
Sharks, the evil observer in Penned-in Sharks, etc.). Furthermore, accepting that the agent 
is not responsible in any of the cases apparently involves rejecting the claim that mere B-
Factors are always irrelevant to moral responsibility. Frankfurt-Style Compatibilists (and 
any other defenders of FSCs) should say that the principle underlying our intuitions about 
FSCs is correct. So they should not accept the claim that John is not responsible in any of 
the cases appealed to in the no principled difference argument. Thus, they cannot 
plausibly draw a line anywhere between Sharks and Hero with regard to John’s 
responsibility. [2015: 1284] 
Swenson’s argument puts pressure on the semicompatibilist to give consistent responses to the 
various cases we have considered, and he thinks that this is an in principle reason to doubt that a 
reply to his argument will be successful. But notice that the considerations to which Swenson 
appeals provide equal support for the hard-line reply that I have developed here. The fact that 
semicompatibilists (who have the intuition that John is responsible in Hero) have reason to doubt 
that they can plausibly draw a line anywhere between Sharks and Hero should motivate them to 
adopt the hard-line reply to the No Principled Difference Argument. And taking this hard-line 
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reply and granting the responsibility of John in Sharks is a live option for the semicompatibilist 
who adopts symmetrical requirements on responsibility for actions and omissions. 
 
6. Van Inwagen’s ‘Direct Argument’ 
The third benefit (to semicompatibilists) of adopting a symmetrical account of the 
requirements on responsibility for actions and omissions is that it allows for a response to van 
Inwagen’s [1983: 182-188] Direct Argument. The Direct Argument is structurally similar to the 
Consequence Argument—sketched in section 2 above—but argues for the incompatibility of 
determinism and responsibility directly (instead of arguing that determinism precludes the ability 
to do otherwise, and then relying on a principle like PAP to get to a conclusion about 
responsibility). This argument relies on two inference rules that govern a ‘no-responsibility’ 
operator. Let ‘NRp’ abbreviate ‘p, and no one is even partly responsible for the fact that p.’ The 
first rule, Rule A, says that if p is broadly logically necessary, then NRp. More formally: 
A. p ⊢ NRp 
The second rule, Rule B, says that if no one is even partly responsible for the fact that p entails q, 
and if no one is even partly responsible for the fact that p, then no one is even partly responsible 
for the fact that q. More formally: 
B. NR(p ⊃ q), NRp ⊢ NRq.  
Now, let ‘P0’ stand for a proposition describing the intrinsic state of the world in the distant past, 
let ‘L’ stand for the conjunction of the laws of nature, and let ‘P’ stand for any true sentence. 
Van Inwagen argues as follows (here I’m following the presentation in Capes [2016: 1479]): 
0. Determinism is true   assumption for conditional proof 
1.  ((P0 & L) ⊃ P)    formal consequence of 0 
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2.  (P0 ⊃ (L ⊃ P))    from 1 
3. NR (P0 ⊃ (L ⊃ P))   from 2 by Rule A 
4. NR P0     premise 
5. NR (L ⊃ P)    from 3 and 4 by Rule B 
6. NR L     premise 
7. NR P    from 5 and 6 by Rule B  
8. Determinism is true ⊃ NR P conditional proof 
Since we used ‘P’ as an abbreviation for any true sentence, it follows from this conclusion that, if 
determinism is true, then no one is even partly responsible for the fact that they perform their 
actions. 
Now, the most popular response to the Direct Argument has been to attempt to provide 
counterexamples to Rule B—examples in which an agent appears responsible for an outcome 
even though that outcome is overdetermined. As Justin Capes has recently argued, however, 
counterexamples to Rule B do not falsify a related inference rule, ‘Transfer NR*’ (a modified 
rule about the transfer of non-responsibility). According to Transfer NR*, ‘if a person is not even 
partly morally responsible for any of the circumstances that led to a particular outcome, and if 
that person is not even partly morally responsible for the fact that those circumstances led to that 
particular outcome, then the person is not even partly morally responsible for the outcome in 
question either’ [2016: 1484]. And since, as Capes convincingly shows, Transfer NR* can play 
the role Rule B originally played in the Direct Argument, the popular response that appeals to 
cases of overdetermination will ultimately fail as a response to the Direct Argument.22 
 
22 See Capes [2016: 1491] for the full presentation of the modified Direct Argument. 
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Given that the popular attempts to falsify Rule B will not succeed in falsifying Capes’s 
rule B*, it would be nice for semicompatibilists to have an alternative line of response to the 
Direct Argument (and to Capes’s modified version of the argument). I will now argue that 
semicompatibilists can gain a principled reason for rejecting Rule A (and Capes’s modified 
version of the rule—rule A*—too) by adopting a symmetrical account of the requirements for 
responsibility for actions and omissions. 
 
7. Against Rule A 
Recall that, on the symmetrical view of responsibility for actions and omissions, an agent 
can be responsible for an omission even if the agent lacks the ability to perform the omitted 
action. If one accepts this view, one accepts the first premise of the following argument: 
1) Agents can be responsible for the fact that they omit to do something that they were 
nonetheless unable to do 
2) If agents can be responsible for the fact that they omit to do something that they were 
nonetheless unable to do, then agents can be responsible for facts that obtain 
necessarily 
3) Agents can be responsible for facts that obtain necessarily23 
The conclusion of this argument is the denial of Rule A of van Inwagen’s Direct Argument (and 
also of rule A* of Capes’s modified version of the argument). Provided that one accepts the 
second premise of my argument, adopting my approach to responsibility for omissions (and thus 
accepting the first premise of this argument) provides a principled reason for rejecting Rule A 
 
23 See Kearns [2011] and Hermes [2014] for different arguments for this same conclusion. 
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and thus for denying the soundness of the Direct Argument. All that remains, then, is to 
determine the plausibility of the second premise of this argument. 
 In my view, this premise enjoys considerable intuitive plausibility. Moreover, to deny it 
would be to maintain that, while one can be responsible for the fact that one omitted to do what 
one was unable to do, one cannot be responsible for the fact that one necessarily omitted to 
perform a certain action. But what reason could there by for maintaining this conjunction of 
views? If one already accepts that agents like the one in the Sharks case can be responsible for 
failing to prevent some inevitable outcome, then one also accepts that an agent can be 
responsible for failing to prevent an outcome that was inevitable because of circumstances over 
which no one had any control. It would be implausible, I submit, to say that agents can be 
responsible for a fact about some inevitable state of affairs only when that fact is not broadly 
logically necessary but only necessary given some features of the circumstances over which no 
one has any control (for example, given the presence of the sharks in the Sharks case). If 
something’s being broadly logically necessary is relevant to an agent’s non-responsibility for that 
thing, it must be because being broadly logically necessary precludes an agent’s control over that 
thing. But if it is admitted that an agent can be responsible for something that is necessary given 
some features of her circumstances over which they have no control, then there is no reason to 
think an agent could not be responsible for some broadly logically necessary fact.  
 Now, we are not typically responsible for facts that obtain necessarily, so one might 
reasonably ask, at this point, which sorts of necessary facts one could be responsible for.24 Recall 
Fischer’s distinction between the factors of a situation which bring about a particular event (the 
A-Factors) and the factors which render the event inevitable but need not cause or bring about 
 
24 Thanks to an anonymous referee and associate editor for raising this question. 
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the event (the B-Factors). The lesson semicompatibilists should take from FSCs is that mere B-
Factors are not relevant to an agent’s responsibility. And just as I claim that the presence of the 
sharks in Sharks is a mere B-Factor (and thus irrelevant to an agent’s responsibility), I submit 
that agent may be responsible for an event even if some necessary fact renders that event 
inevitable, whether the fact is physically, metaphysically, or even logically necessary. What 
matters is whether the fact is an A-Factor or a mere B-Factor, and provided that the agent is 
unaware of the necessary fact, the fact can be a mere B-Factor and thus will not undermine the 
agent’s responsibility. Of course, if I know that it is a necessary truth that squares have four 
sides, then I can omit to prove that a particular square has three sides and cite the necessary truth 
as a reason I am not responsible for my omission (the fact is an A-Factor). But suppose that 
Smith believes he can prove that some necessarily false mathematical claim but decides not to.25 
On my view, Smith may be responsible for his omission, as the necessity of his failure to prove 
the claim was a mere B-Factor. 
I suspect that those inclined to reject the conclusion of the above argument will also be 
inclined to reject its first premise. After all, the first premise seems to be the easier target, and 
even many compatibilists have wanted to reject it (for example, taking a soft-line response to 
Swenson’s argument). But here I have, in effect, argued for the plausibility of that premise (or at 
least for its plausibility given a certain reaction to FSCs), motivating it and defending it against a 
recent objection. I conclude that semicompatibilists are best served by adopting a symmetrical 
account of the requirements for responsibility for actions and omissions and reaping the rewards 
that come with adopting that account.  
 
25 This case, suggested by an anonymous referee, is very similar to the one discussed by Kearns 
[2011: 316ff]. 
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